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Abstract: This study examined the impact of enterprise risk management (ERM) and internal audit function 
(IAF) on the financial reporting quality (FRQ) of state universities in Zimbabwe. Utilizing a dataset of 250 
respondents from across nine (9) state universities, the researchers examined the effectiveness of ERM and 
the IAF on the quality of financial reporting in state universities. The researchers employed the contingency 
theory and studied each university separately to report on items that are specific to each and then also 
establish a commonality in the definition of parameters to be used in setting up the benchmark against which 
future performance may be measured. The findings were that there is a strong and significant relationship 
between ERM and the FRQ and also that there is a positive relationship between the internal audit function 
and FRQ. Quality internal audit results improved corporate governance systems. The results also underscore 
the significance and need for central government to establish and monitor a system of good ERM processes 
that minimize corporate governance breaches and enhance integrity and independence in financial reporting 
in state universities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The propagation of crises and scandals in recent years in Zimbabwean state enterprises has demonstrated 
the failure of the current governance systems. “These crises have prompted regulators to provide financial 
security laws and codes of conduct in the form of the Public Finance Management Act Chapter 22:19, Code of 
Corporate Governance for Parastatals and State Enterprises, and the Procurement Act, Chapter 2:14”(Smith 
and Adhikari, 2005:34). These laws give much importance to the concept of mandatory disclosure of financial 
information by these state run organizations and give, at a minimum, what may be considered as good 
business conduct. What is still interesting is the fact that none of these state run enterprises has shown an 
affinity to voluntarily disclose the results of their operations over and above the stipulations or mandatory 
minimums. Indeed, with globalization the role of voluntary disclosure is increasingly being debated at an 
international level (Smith, and Adhikari, 2005). Disclosure is situation specific and its measurement is with 
reference to an assessment of compliance to a set standard giving rise to a disclosure index. Disclosure 
however remains a theoretical concept that is difficult to measure directly (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The 
focus of this research was, however not on what is or what is not disclosed but rather on the quality of what is 
disclosed. It thus puts emphasis on the usefulness and true representativeness of the resultant financial 
reporting. While some prior studies (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Richardson, 2006b; Prawitt, 2009; Mayer et 
al. 2009) have focused on the effect of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) on firm performance and value, 
they have not explicitly addressed the relationship between ERM and the quality of the financial reporting 
process. A strong financial reporting process includes diligence by preparing and monitoring parties such as 
the audit committee and auditors in providing accurate and transparent financial reports and associated 
disclosures.  
 
On the other hand, the audit process and audit quality have a significant impact on the quality of financial 
reports (Knechel et al. 2013). A few prior studies (e.g. Kochetova and Net, 2011; McVay, 2006; Jones et 
al.2003; Jonas and Blanchet, 2002; Erickson, 2006) have examined the effect of strategic analysis and 
strategic risk (components of ERM) on auditor judgments, but these studies have not considered the effect of 
ERM on the audit process and audit judgments from a broader, more holistic contingent perspective. The 
strength of ERM impacts the company’s monitoring of controls over major business risks, which is important 
for auditors to consider in audit planning (Bell et al. 2002; D’Aquila, 1998; Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 
2005). Further, although audit committees and Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) are increasingly required to play 
a critical role with respect to ERM (Mikes, 2009), there has been no research that examines how either audit 
committees or (Chief Finance Officers) CFOs view the role of ERM in ensuring a high quality financial 
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reporting framework. The importance of this study is therefore to establish the contribution of enterprise risk 
management and internal audit function towards the quality of financial reporting in universities in a 
developing country. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Different authors define financial reporting quality in different ways. Asare et al (2008) define quality as ‘…a 
hierarchy of accounting qualities, with relevance and reliability considered the primary ones. In addition, the 
statement has a set of criteria, such as representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, predictive value, 
feedback, comparability, consistency, and timeliness”. One is then compelled to probably conclude that 
overall financial reporting quality is thus assessed on the basis of how well the reporting entity has covered 
each of the criteria given above. The Jenkins Committee (1994) did not refer to the “quality of financial 
reporting” but rather the “quality of reported earnings.” Its definition is not very instructive, and it appears 
that quality is related to both the ability to predict and the relevance of the information. In identifying quality, 
the Jenkins Committee used several concepts that emphasize users’ needs, such as understanding the nature 
of a company’s businesses and performance, changes affecting the company, management’s perspective, and 
others. Larcker et al. (2004), consider accounting quality as a factor useful in coming up with an industrial 
bond issue rating and not as an end in itself. They affirm that firms that consistently make timely and 
informative disclosures are considered less likely to withhold relevant unfavourable information. Although 
one should expect that “better” corporate governance leads to improved financial reporting, there is a lack of 
consensus as to what constitutes “financial reporting quality. Jonas and Blanchet (2002, 353) state, “in light of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) new requirements, auditors, audit committee members, and management are now 
struggling to define “quality of financial reporting.” Cohen et al. (2008) assert that rather than define “quality 
of financial reporting,” it was more important to analyze factors such as earnings management, financial 
restatements, and fraud that clearly inhibit the attainment of high quality financial reports. One would then 
be expected to infer financial reporting quality by reference to the presence of these factors as evidence of a 
breakdown in the financial reporting process. Also one has to examine the role of the various players in the 
governance mosaic, as discussed below and the extent to which these players either individually or 
collectively influence the attainment of financial reports that are free from material misstatements and 
misrepresentations. This synergistic interplay is what regulates financial reporting quality and is the main 
focus of this study. 
 
Good Corporate Governance: The corporate governance mosaic impacts the quality of financial reporting 
(e.g., transparency, objectivity) and, in the extreme, earnings manipulation and outright fraud. The 
governance mosaic includes those stakeholders inside and outside the firm. Unfortunately, prior research and 
the accounting profession have concentrated their focus primarily on the board of directors and the audit 
committee. This has given the impression that these two are the only or most important players in the 
governance mosaic. This is not so. For instance, the external auditor plays a significant role in monitoring 
financial reporting quality and hence can be viewed as an important participant in the governance process. 
All other players work synergistically in the corporate governance mosaic and deserve equal air play as the 
audit committee and the board of directors. Examples of such other actors include, but are not limited to, 
regulators, legislators, financial analysts, stock exchanges, courts and the legal system, and the shareholders.  
More so, current debate has failed to talk to the interplay between the stakeholders. These interactions such 
as those among the audit committee, the external auditor, the internal auditor, the board, and the 
management are crucial to effective governance and to achieving high quality financial reporting (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002). This interplay is also affected by outside forces such as by regulators and stock exchanges as 
well as by pressure to meet the stringent expectations of financial analysts. Thus external players often shape 
and influence the interactions among the members of the mosaic who are more directly involved in the 
governance of the organisation. 
 
Also pathetic to research on corporate governance is the manner in which the governance debate has been 
unfairly looked at. Corporate governance plays a much more important role within an organisation. Larcker 
et al. (2004, 1) also debate this lack of deeper research by saying that current research has not been able to 
explain managerial behaviour and how this impacts organizational performance. Cohen et al. (2002) 
conducted an interview study with experienced auditors and revealed that management has a significant 
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influence over these parties. Some of the auditors in that study argue that if management does not want to be 
“governed”, they can’t be (Cohen et al. 2002:582). Moreover, management is fraudulently capable of placing 
passive, compliant members on the board who may satisfy regulatory requirements but are reluctant to 
challenge their appointers, the management. 
 
Theoretical Framework: The study adopted the Social learning theory. This theory suggests that setting the 
tone at the top will inspire individuals within the organization to emulate the behaviour of attractive role 
models like ethical leaders (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Utilizing social learning theory, research suggests that 
good corporate governance trickles-down from the top level of management, to immediate supervisors, and 
ultimately to employees. For the financial reporting process, this trickle down impact is important because it 
means that by setting the tone at the top, ethical leaders can influence the reporting behaviour of not only 
management but also of those employees making the day-to-day decisions including final accounts 
preparation like deputies or assistant bursars and accounting assistants. 
 
Hypotheses Development: Developing the discussion further, we investigated how the triad combination of 
internal audit function quality, ERM and good corporate governance work synergistically to create a control 
environment that can influence the quality of financial reporting. Since the strength of the internal audit 
function in ERM and good corporate governance are integral components of internal control, my interest is in 
examining how these two factors come together and influence an accounting decision which will ultimately 
affect reporting quality. Accordingly, we put forward the following hypothesis:  
H1: “In an entity with a strong IAF and a weak ethical leader, accountants will be less willing to make a 
dubious journal entry than in all other conditions. Specifically, accountants will be less willing to make a 
questionable entry when there is a strong IAF and a weak ethical leader. 
H0: In an environment with a weak IAF and a strong ethical leader, accountants will most likely take down 
instructions without questioning and hence lead to poor financial reporting”. 
 
The latter discussion also results in the following sub-hypothesis 
HSub: An environment with a strong IAF and a strong ethical leader is most likely to produce quality financial 
reports. 
 
Research Questions: The following research questions guided data collection through surveys and 
interviews: 
 How does the internal audit function in an organisation relate to the risk management practice 
within that very organisation? 
 What is the relationship between ERM and good corporate governance? 
 What is the relationship between ERM, good corporate governance and the internal audit function? 
 What is the relationship between ERM; GCG; IAF and financial reporting quality? 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study utilized a multiple case study design. Case studies are “an exploration of a ‘bounded system’ of a 
case or multiple cases over time through detail, in depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information rich in context” (Creswell: 2013). In order to gain multiple perspectives in the area of ERM, IAF 
and CG as they relate to financial reporting quality, this study used the maximum variation sampling strategy 
(Creswell, 1998). To achieve this, two hundred and fifty (250) accounting professionals or personnel were 
recruited from the nine (9) state universities in Zimbabwe to participate in the study. The personnel included 
both executives and non-executives from the nine (9) state universities including one individual from each 
identified as the risk champion from that particular institution. There were also personnel from the IAF of 
each institution, an assistant bursar and a deputy bursar from each university, a representative from any such 
grouping in each university as is mandated to see to the risk management of the university other than the risk 
champion. The participants were identified with the assistance of a gatekeeper. The research used both a 
qualitative and quantitative approach to gather, analyze and describe findings.  
 
Data Sources: The data sources that were used in this study comprised of both primary and secondary data. 
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Primary Data: Primary data was obtained from respondents using interviews and questionnaires 
administered to personnel in seven (7) of the nine (9) state owned universities in Zimbabwe. 
 
Secondary Data: Secondary data was collected through the review of published financial statements, annual 
reports, and strategic plan documents of respective state universities. The internet was also widely consulted 
on current issues and publications on activities. A self- administered, structured questionnaire, interviews 
and documents were used to collect data. 
 
4. Findings 
 
Table 1: Category of Respondent     
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Executive Staff                        3714.8           15.9            15.9 
Middle Management                147              58.8            63.4            79.3 
Junior Staff Grades                     48              19.2            20.7             100 
Total                                            232              92.8           100.0 
 
Category of respondents: The respondents were categorized into executive staff, middle management and 
junior Staff grades within their respective institutions. In table 1 above, middle management had the highest 
number of respondents with a representation of 63.4% of the total respondents. This also represents 6.25% 
in default (non-respondents). Top management accounted for 15.9% of total respondents with a default of 
7.5%. On the other hand, junior staff had a non-respondent rate of only 4%. 
 
Factor analysis: The characteristics used in the variables of the conceptual framework were tested using 
factor analysis to establish whether they were good measurements. The extraction method used was the 
principle component analysis and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Items under 
internal audit function with a correlation of less than 0.4 were excluded from the rotation table (Richardson, 
2006b) while under good corporate governance, items with correlation of less than 0.5 were excluded. 
 
Factor Analysis of the Good Corporate Governance scale: Table 2 below, shows that seven constructs 
were appropriate for measuring good corporate governance, given, that they explained 72% of the total 
variance. The construct on clear institutional strategy accounted for 8% of the variance, while effective risk 
management explained 15% of the variance, discipline explained most of the variance 12%, fairness 
explained 10% of the variance, social responsibility represented 3%, self-evaluation 13% and transparency 
explained 11% of the variance. From the findings it is clear that the self-discipline, self-evaluation, effective 
risk management and transparency constructs are the most important (with Eigen values of 4.409 and 2.176 
respectively). On the other side of the scale; social responsibility and institutional strategy as well as fairness 
were found to be of insignificant importance (with Eigen values of 1.747, 1.589 and 1.466 respectively). 
 
Factor Analysis of the Internal Audit Quality scale: Internal audit quality accounted for 28% of the 
variance. According to table 2, a four-construct scale proved to be the most appropriate for measuring quality 
of the internal audit function in accounting for this total variance. The internal audit reporting structure 
construct accounted for the most variance of 12%. The independence construct explained 8% of the variance, 
with 5% being explained by the internal audit existence construct. Internal audit composition and capacity 
accounted for 3% of the variance. From the findings, it has been observed that internal audit reporting 
structure (with an Eigen value of 3.13) within the university system is the most important construct of 
internal audit function quality. The independence of the internal audit function is next in importance with an 
Eigen value of 1.519 whilst the existence construct at 5% and the internal audit team composition and 
capacity construct at 3% are of lesser importance (Eigen values of 1.186 and 1.026, respectively). 
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Table 2: Rotated Characteristic Matrix for Good Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Question                       1             2             3             4             5                  6          7 
GCG-B17                       0.801 
GCG-B15                       0.762 
GCG-B16                       0.635 
GCG-B8                                         0.797 
GCG-B9                                         0.794 
GCG-B7                                         0.711 
GCG-B11                                       0.440 
GCG-B12                                                     0.797 
GCG-B1                                                       0.736 
GCG-B13                                                     0.689 
GCG-B4                                                                       0.769 
GCG-B5                                                                       0.706 
GCG-B3                                                                       0.704 
GCG-A3                                                                                    0.791 
GCG-A2                                                                                    0.681 
GCG-B6                                                                                    0.572 
GCG-B2                                                                                    0.473 
GCG-B12                                                                                                     0.707 
GCG-B1                                                                                                       0.763 
GCG-B13                                                                                                     0.669 
GCG-B4                                                                                                                      0.779 
GCG-B5                                                                                                                      0.716 
GCG-B3                                                                                                                      0.701 
Eigen values               4.409     2.176     1.747       1.589      1.466 
% of variance             15           13          12           11           10              8              3 
Cumulative % Var     15           28         40           51             61            69            72 
Notes: Characteristic 1= Effective Risk Management, Characteristic 2=Self Evaluation, Characteristic 3= 
Discipline, Characteristic 4=Transparency, Characteristic 5= fairness, Characteristic 6= Clear Institutional 
Strategy, Characteristic 7= Social Responsibility 
n=232 
 
Table 3: Rotated Component Matrix for Internal Audit Function Components 
Questions                               1                      2                     3                      4 
IAF Q8                                     0.778 
IAF Q11                                   0.736 
IAF Q2                                                             0.850 
IAF Q1                                                             0.740 
IAF Q3                                                                                     0.756 
IAF Q10                                                                                   0.689 
IAF Q4                                                                                     0.666 
IAF Q2                                                                                                           0.850 
IAF Q1                                                                                                           0.740 
IAF Q3                                                                                                           0.756 
Eigen Value                              3.130            1.519                 1.186         1.026           
% Variance                               12                  8                        5                 3 
Cumulative % Variance         12                  20                    25               28 
Notes; Component 1= Internal Audit Reporting Structure, Component 2 = Internal Audit Independence, 
Component 3 =Internal Audit Existence & Capacity, Component 4 = Internal Audit Team Composition 
n=232 
 
Inferential analysis: Inferential analysis was done where by correlations were obtained to establish the 
relationship that exists between variables conceptualized in the framework 
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Table 4: Spearman’s Correlation matrix of the global variables   
FRQ           ERM         IAF     GCG 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY (FRQ)   1.000 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT (ERM)  0.266          1.000 
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION (IAF)             0.314**       0.329**   1.000 
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (GCG)    0.421          0.213      0.178      1.000 
**correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Relationship between good corporate governance and financial reporting quality: This relationship is 
shown as significantly strong with r=0. 421.This clearly shows that good corporate governance plays a 
significant role in ensuring that financial reporting process produces quality results. 
 
Relationship between the internal audit function and financial reporting quality: The results of the 
correlation matrix in Table 4 above shows that there was a positive significant relationship between the IAF 
and financial reporting quality (r=0.314, P-value <1%). The positive relationship implies that as the IAF 
improves the quality of services, financial reporting quality also improves. This clearly indicates that as the 
internal audit function performs its duty with diligence and independently with an enabling reporting 
structure, then an institution is more likely to digress from manipulation of transactions and results and thus 
produce quality financial reports that are free from misstatement and misrepresentation.  
 
Relationship between financial reporting quality and enterprise risk management: A positive and 
significant relationship was also found to exist between ERM in aggregate and financial reporting quality 
(r=0.266, P-value < 1%). Deductively this shows that the stronger the efforts at instituting an enterprise wide 
risk management process the more likely the university is to quickly curb any anomalies in reporting and the 
result will be quality financial statements. 
 
Multiple regressions: Regression analysis was performed using stepwise regression method to explain the 
variability of the relationship between the independent variables of ERM, GCG and IAF and, on the other hand, 
financial reporting quality as the dependent variable in state universities. 
 
Table 5: Multiple regression analysis 
Variable                      Standard       t-test     Sig.     R Squared    Adj. R      F       Sig. F 
                                     Coefficient                                                  Squared      
IAF                                  2.166          0.031        0.174         0.390                    35.910   0.000 
ERM                                0.238         4.058         0.000 
GOOD Corp Gov          0.482         7.528         0.000 
 
The results as shown in table 5 above, indicate a significant linear relationship between ERM, GCG and 
financial reporting quality (F=35.910, Sig=0.000). The relationship is linear because sig. is P< 0.5%.ERM and 
GCG explain 39.0% of financial reporting quality in which ERM (Beta=0.365) influences more of financial 
reporting quality than (Beta=0.200). This implies that 100% change in GCG led to 48.2% change in financial 
reporting quality and 100% change in ERM only resulted in 23.80% change in financial reporting quality. 
 
Inferential analysis: The correlations were obtained to establish the relationship that exists between the 
constructs of the variables conceptualized in the framework. 
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Table 6: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix for the Relationship between Good Corporate Governance and 
Internal Auditing Function 
               GCG 1   GCG 2   GCG      IAF  1   IAF2       IAF3     IAF  
GCG 1     0.000 
GCG 2     0.188**  0.000 
GCG        0.544**   0.899**  0.000 
IAF  1    0.108*     0.233**   0.247**   0.000 
IAF  2    0.039       0.123*     0.111*     0.376**   0.000 
IAF  3    0.110*      0.111*    0.131*     0.201**   0.238**   0 .000 
IAF        0.120*      0.201**   0.212**   0 .673      0.710**  0.728** 0.000 
Note; GCG 1=Some Practice of good Corporate Governance, GCG 2= Selective Application and Practice of Good 
Corporate Governance, GCG=Absolute Compliance with dictates of Good Corporate Governance, 
IAF 1= Internal Audit Reporting Structure, IAF 2=Internal Audit Independence, IAF 3= Internal Audit 
Existence, Composition of Team and Capacity, IAF = Internal Audit Function Quality 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
The results in table 6 above, show that there some significant positive relationships between the IAF 
constructs and GCG indicating that in state universities the internal audit function impacts greatly on the 
nature and quality of the governance systems. This is clear and consistent with the following findings made 
by Roth (2002). These are supported by the 
 Selective application and practice of good corporate governance construct had 3 significant 
correlations (i.e. against internal audit reporting structure: r=0.233, p-value<1%; ‘internal audit 
independence’: r=0.123, p-value<5%; and ‘Internal Audit Existence, Composition of Team and 
Capacity’: r=0.111, p-value<5%) 
 “Some practice of good corporate governance” abstract had 2 significant correlations ((i.e. against 
“internal audit reporting structure”: r=0.108, p-value<0.05; and ‘Internal Audit Existence, 
Composition of Team and Capacity’: r=0.110, p-value<0.05) 
 This positive relationship indicates that it is probable that when the internal audit function improves 
in quality (and thus adding value to its services), the quality of good corporate governance moves 
from non-compliance through selective application of best practice to absolute observation and 
adoption of good corporate governance styles. Deductively this will terminate in the entity’s financial 
reporting quality increasing. 
 
Table 6: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix for the Relationship between Enterprise Risk Management 
and Good Corporate Governance 
ERM1 ERM2   ERM3   ERM4   ERM5   ERM   GCG1   GCG2   GCG3   GCG 
ERM1 0.000 
ERM2 0.092   0.000 
ERM3 0.309**0.269**0.000 
ERM4 0.252**0.304**0.259**0.000  
ERM5 0.219**0.280**0.330**0.377** 0.000 
ERM    0.563**0.624**0.635**0.642** 0.708** 0.000 
GCG 1 0.129* 0.097    0.199** 0.279** 0.080   0.243** 0.000 
GCG 2 0.244**0.119* 0.259** 0.270** 0.045 0. 261**0.376** 0.000 
GCG 3 0.200**0.103 0.430** 0.179** 0.078   0.262** 0.201** 0.238** 0.000 
GCG 0.263** 0.113** 0.431** 0.316** 0.068 0.329** 0.673** 0.710** 0.728** 0.000 
Note; ERM1= Management Buy-in, ERM2=Existence of a Risk Management Framework, ERM3= Effectiveness 
of Risk Management Process, ERM4=Enterprise Wide Knowledge of Risk Management, ERM5=Reporting 
framework, ERM=Enterprise Risk Management, 
GCG 1=Some Practice of good Corporate Governance, GCG 2= Selective Application and Practice of Good 
Corporate Governance, GCG 3=Absolute Compliance with dictates of Good Corporate Governance, GCG = Good 
Corporate Governance. 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level 
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*Correlation is significant at the 5% level 
 
According to Table 6 above, all the constructs of ERM showed a positive significant relationship with Good 
Corporate Governance. This indicates that the below listed are the most important characteristics of 
enterprise risk management in state universities. These are the ones that may be perceived as impacting on 
the quality of financial reporting. 
 “Management Buy-In” with 3 significant correlations (i.e. against some practice of Good Corporate 
Governance: r=0.129, p<5%; ‘Selective Application and Practice of Good Corporate Governance’: r=0.244, 
p<1%; and ‘Absolute Compliance with dictates of Good Corporate Governance’: r=0.200, p<1%) 
 “Existence of a Risk Management Framework” with one significant correlation (i.e. against ‘Selective 
Application and Practice of Good Corporate Governance’: r=0.119, p<5%) 
 “Effectiveness of Risk Management Process” with 3 significant correlations (i.e. against ‘Some Practice of 
Good corporate governance’: r=0.199, p<1%; Selective Application and Practice of Good Corporate 
Governance’: r=0.259, p<1%; and ‘Absolute Compliance with dictates of Good Corporate Governance’: 
r=0.430, p<1%) 
 “Enterprise wide knowledge of risk management” with 3 significant correlations (i.e. against ‘Some 
Practice of Good corporate governance’ absolute compliance with statutory dictates: r=0.279, p<1%; 
‘Selective Application and Practice of Good Corporate Governance’: r=0.270, p<1%; and ‘Absolute Compliance 
with dictates of Good Corporate Governance’: r=0.179, p<1%) 
 
The interpretation of this positive influence is that when the institution’s management accepts and fully 
embraces ERM (management buy-in), and when they put in efforts at establishing and supporting the 
existence of a risk management framework and that this risk management framework allows for the effective 
running of the risk management process through the intentional and dedicated spread of knowledge on 
enterprise risk management, this would result in improved financial reporting quality. This implies that the 
state university’s financial reporting quality will improve from ‘non-compliance with statute’ to ‘some 
compliance with statute’; and ultimately to absolute compliance with statutory dictates’. 
 
Table 7: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix for the Relationship between Good Corporate Governance and 
Enterprise Risk Management (Crossed with IAF) 
                     GCG1 GCG2   GCG       ERM/   ERM/   ERM/   ERM/   ERM/    ERM/ 
                                                                   IAF1   IAF2     IAF3     IAF4     IAF5      IAF 
GCG1         0.000 
GCG2         0.178**   0.000 
GCG           0.543**   0.900** 0.000 
ERM/IAF1 -0.169** -0.038   -0.099       0.000 
ERM/IAF2 -0.048     -0.024   -0.015       0.091     0.000 
ERM/IAF3 0.019       0.129** 0.111*    0.310** 0.270** 0.000 
ERM/IAF4 -0.030      0.092     0.049      0.254** 0.318** 0.260** 0.000 
ERM/IAF5 -0.165** 0.035    -0.040      0.220** 0.210** 0.299** 0.378** 0.000 
ERM/IAF-0.129*   0.085     0.030    0.571** 0.625** 0.640** 0.652** 0.710** 0.000 
Note; GCG 1=No Observance of Codes of Best Practice, GCG 2= Some observance of Provisions of Codes of 
Best Practice, GCG=Good Corporate Governance 
ERM/IAF1= Management Buy-in crossed with Internal Audit Existence, ERM/IAF2=Existence of a Risk 
Management Framework crossed with Existence of Internal Audit Function. ERM/IAF3= Effectiveness of Risk 
Management Process crossed with IAF Capacity and Quality of IAF, ERM/IAF4=Enterprise Wide Knowledge of 
Risk Management, ERM/IAF5=Reporting framework crossed with internal audit Independence and reporting 
structure, ERM/IAF=Enterprise Risk Management/Crossed with Internal Audit Function, 
**Correlation is significant at the 1% level 
*Correlation is significant at the 5% level 
 
Table 7 shows that there was a mixture of both positive and negative significant correlations between ERM x 
IAF and good corporate governance constructs. Internal audit existence x ERM existence or 
institutionalization of the internal audit function and enterprise risk management had negative significant 
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correlation with good corporate governance; and IAF x ERM quality had positive significant correlations with 
good corporate governance. 
 ‘No observance of codes of Best Practice in Corporate governance’ with 2 significant correlations (i.e. 
Management Buy-in crossed with existence of Internal Audit Function:  r = -0.169, p-value<1%; and 
ERM framework crossed with Internal Audit Independence & Reporting Framework: r = -0.165, p-
value<1%) 
 ‘some observance of Provisions of Codes of Best Practice’: with 1 significant correlation (i.e. 
effectiveness of Risk Management Process crossed with IAF’s Capacity and quality’: r=0.129, p-
value<1%) 
 
The interpretation, as observed, is that when the quality of internal audit is coupled up with quality 
enterprise risk management the result is most likely to be the continual improvement of good corporate 
governance practices. With good corporate governance one expects quality financial reporting to prevail. 
 
Discussion 
 
Relationship between the internal audit function and enterprise risk management: IAF was found to 
have a positive, weak and insignificant relationship with ERM. This implies that the presence or absence of an 
internal audit function has very little and insignificant influence on the success or failure of the ERM process 
within an organization. This is consistent with the findings made by Dickinson (2010) who however goes 
further to assert that IA must maintain a degree of independence within the organization to ensure that 
“…they are in a position to critically assess the effectiveness of risk management and the adequacy of the 
control environment”. Regardless of whether ERM and internal audit operate as distinct and separate units, 
or are closely aligned, it is imperative that they leverage off each other, continually developing knowledge of 
the environments in which they operate. The two must work within the same risk management framework 
and conduct dialogue to continually question and engage each other’s perspective of the nature and severity 
of the risk profile. It is important that the IAF plays both a monitoring and participative role in ensuring that 
the risks the organization is exposed to are sufficiently mitigated. IA also checks on compliance to best 
practice in mitigating identified risks. IA and ERM also play complementing roles in the corporate governance 
processes of a university. In actual fact, IA is an inherent component or construct of ERM. No effective ERM 
effort can be implemented without roping in the eagle eye of internal audit. Dickinson (2010) also concludes 
his findings by saying that there are circumstances where the two functions of internal audit and ERM do not 
operate effectively. This happens when management dictates to internal audit in order to divert attention 
away from high risk areas. Resultantly this is why some organizations have enabling reporting structures that 
allow for IA to operate independently and for reporting channels that allow direct communication to the 
audit committee. 
 
Relationship between internal audit function and financial reporting quality: According to the findings, 
there exists a significant positive relationship between internal audit function quality and financial reporting 
quality. The presence of the IAF in a university brings along the following benefits: improved accuracy of 
information, confirmed compliance to policy and statutory dictates, avoided cost since using internal audit 
means no external consultants are hired to do this with the result that the savings are put to improving other 
facets of financial reporting. IAF existence enhances compliance to laws and regulations to mitigate potential 
future fines or legal cases. Turner (2001) asserts that internal audit quality and external auditor tenure are 
important determinants of audit effectiveness and that their combined effect plays a critical role in 
preventing and detecting fraudulent misstatements. Mitra (2009) found that the shorter an auditor’s tenure, 
the higher the risk of misstatement in the financial reporting process 
 
Relationship between internal audit function and good corporate governance: There is some significant 
positive relationship between IAF and GCG indicating that in state universities the internal audit function 
impacts greatly on the nature and quality of the governance systems. This is clear and consistent with the 
findings made by Roth (2002) on the generalized relationship between internal audit and value addition 
through corporate governance. On the other hand, however, Abbott (2005), found that that the competence 
and independence of the audit function is negatively associated with the occurrence of fraudulent accounting 
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misstatements. Fairchild (2009) suggest that auditor tenure may have conflicting effects on the detection and 
/or revelation of management fraudulent behavior. 
 
Relationship between good corporate governance and financial reporting quality: There was a positive 
and significant relationship found between GCG and financial reporting quality. This is consistent with the 
findings by Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002), who ascend that if constructs on good corporate governance are 
adhered to religiously, then the result is absolute compliance with statutory and preset dictates. This is 
interpreted as quality financial reporting. McDaniel et al. (2002) however found out that it was difficult to 
agree on what may be called quality financial reporting. Different organizations’ assessments of relevance and 
comparability characteristics of quality were different from one organization to the next. According to the 
author this dilemma also exists in the comparison of the concept when done by financial accountants 
(literates) as compared to general business and investment experts. Literates raise more concern than 
experts on items that are non-recurring or receive high salience in the press. 
 
Relationship between internal audit function, enterprise risk management, good corporate 
governance and financial reporting quality: According to Dickinson (2010), there are various models of 
governance but the generally accepted models are two of the main components of governance structure 
which are: the effectiveness of management’s risk management practices and the internal audit’s monitoring 
of how effective these practices are. It is no surprise that the variables in the conceptual framework to this 
study were found to influence each other and also affecting the dependent variable, FRQ, at varying 
magnitudes. The independent variables i.e. ERM and GCG (encompassing IAF) were found to be influencing 
financial reporting quality positively. However, ERM has the greatest influence. The variables: ERM and GCG 
positively and significantly relate to financial reporting quality. However, according to Armstrong et al. 
(2010), there is little evidence on the causal effect of corporate governance on financial reporting and they 
attribute this to the joint endogeneity of governance mechanisms and accounting systems. On the other hand, 
Cheng and Warfield 2005, found a negative relationship between managerial equity incentives and the quality 
of financial reporting. Others find no relation between the two. These mixed findings clearly indicate a lack of 
consensus as to whether there is that relationship or causal effect between corporate governance and 
financial reporting (and FRQ). The endogeneity of CG and FR and the determinants of each are equally 
intertwined and no clear cut distinction or causal effect can be inferred. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Internal audit function quality was found to influence financial reporting quality in the following manner: in 
that the strength, or quality, of the IAF will contribute to a distinctly different control environment depending 
on the strength of the good corporate governance in the university. This has been tested and proven to be 
true in the study. Internal audit plays the dual role of a promoter and supporter of both accuracy and process 
of financial reporting. The IAF serves as an independent party to help ensure that internal control over 
financial reporting and the corporate governance process are effective (i.e., process objective) in ultimately 
producing accurate financial results (i.e., accuracy objective).  
 
Recommendations 
 Government, through the relevant line ministries, should move in to supervise state universities and 
help uphold the principles of good corporate governance. This effort should be enforced through the 
mandatory request for the establishment and running of an efficient enterprise risk management 
system at each institution.  
 Central government is encouraged to see to the existence and running of an effective ERM system in 
all state universities. This will ensure the existence of commonality in reporting frameworks, thus 
establishing a benchmark against which future performance can be measured. After all state 
enterprises rely heavily on subsidies accruing from taxpayers and if this is anything to go by, one 
would expect these institutions to effectively and efficiently use resources allocated to them this way. 
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